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I. INTRODUCTION
In Ohio ForestryAssociation, Inc. v. Sierra Club,' two environmental groups
challenged the U.S. Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan
(LRMP) for the Wayne National Forest in Ohio, claiming that it allowed too
much logging and clearcutting.2 An association of forest industry interests,
intervening on behalf of the Forest Service, claimed that the plan itself did not
initiate specific timber sales, and thus was not ripe- for review.' On May 18,
1998, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision, written by Justice Breyer,
held the challenge was not ripe and thereby limited the availability of judicial
review of Forest Service LRMPs under the ripeness doctrine.
Despite the limitations placed on challenges to forest plans by the Ohio
Forestry holding, dicta specifically identified two types of challenges the
*. J.D. expected 2001, University of Montana School of Law.
1. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
2. Id. at731.
3. Ik at 732.
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Court would consider ripe for judicial review: procedural claims, and substan-
tive claims alleging site-specific and imminent harm. However, recent federal
district and appellate court decisions demonstrate that questions remain as to
the effect of the Ohio Forestry ruling on various challenges involving LRMPs.
This article provides background on the ripeness doctrine, LRMPs, previous
cases challenging forest plans, and then examines the Wayne National Forest
case in detail. An analysis of the decision's implications follows, illustrated
by recent cases that consider LRMPs and interpret Ohio Forestry. This article
concludes that recent LRMP decisions by lower courts are inconsistent in their
characterization of claims as either procedural or substantive. Courts also
misconstrue Ohio Forestry to require site-specific allegations in procedural
claims, as well as claims alleging substantive defects in a plan. In light of
Ohio Forestry, courts should consider ripe claims of procedural defects in
agencies' creation and implementation of LRMPs, without requiring allega-
tions of imminent site-specific injuries. Courts also apply the Ohio Forestry
requirement of site-specific allegations of imminent harm in cases that do not
challenge the LRMP itself, but an agency's failure to follow the plan's manda-
tory requirements. This article concludes that in cases challenging an agen-
cies' failure to follow its own LRMP, reliance on Ohio Forestry is misplaced
and serves only to confuse the issue.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Ripeness Doctrine
Ripeness and the related doctrine of standing are concepts of justiciability
that limit access to courts by requiring a determination of "whether the litigant
is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular
issues."4 The source of both doctrines is disputed, but standing is now gener-
ally accepted as a non-discretionary requirement of the "case or controversy"
element in Article El of the Constitution.5 Though ripeness is frequently
associated with Article III, it is often characterized by the Supreme Court as
a prudential limit.6 Since the Court addresses the ripeness issue but declines
discussion of standing in line with its practice of not deciding cases on consti-
tutional grounds when discretionary limitations are available, Ohio Forestry
4. Paul A. Garrahan, Failing to See the Forest for the Trees: Standing to Challenge National Forest
Management Plans, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 158-59 (1996) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498
(1974)).
5. Id. at 159.
6. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 155 (1987).
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supports the proposition that ripeness is a prudential and discretionary limita-
tion.7
Despite their differing sources, the doctrines of standing and ripeness are so
closely related that "[flew courts draw meaningful distinctions between the
two."' One reason for this confusion is that tests for the justiciability of a
controversy under both doctrines initially address the imminence of injury to
the plaintiff in similar terms.9 The important distinction between the two is
that standing determines the proper party to bring suit, where ripeness deter-
mines the proper time to bring suit." Some courts recognize the ripeness
doctrine as a more appropriate tool to determine the justiciability of injuries
that have not yet occurred."
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner" is the leading case on the ripeness doc-
trine as applied to challenges to administrative actions. The Supreme Court
stated that the ripeness doctrine's "basic rationale is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."' 3
The Court also stated a two-prong test for deciding whether an agency's deci-
sion is ripe for judicial review, requiring evaluation of both "the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision, and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration."'' 4
B. Land and Resource Management Plans
The Forest Service's current system of forest planning originated in the
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act,'5 which was even-
tually amended by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).' 6 NFMA
incorporated the Resources Planning Act's requirement that the Forest Service
7. Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, The Supreme Court Restricts the Availability of
Forest-Wide Judicial Review in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10621, 10626
(1998) (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 732. Quarles represented the petitioner, Ohio Forestry Associa-
tion, in Ohio Forestry.
8. Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 389 (11 Cir. 1996).
9. Id. at 390. One prong of the standing test requires the injury be "actual or imminent," and the
traditional ripeness test requires it be immediate or imminently threatened. Id
10. Id.
11. Id
12. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
13. Id. at 148-49.
14. lId at 149.
15. Kelly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest of the Standing Doctrine: Challenging Resource
Management Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 U. ARK. LrrrL.E ROCK L.J. 223, 231 (1996);
Garrahan, supra note 4, at 147-149.
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
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develop integrated LRMPs for each unit of the National Forest System. 17
LRMPs are analogous to city zoning regulations, because they identify appro-
priate uses for different areas within a national forest, but do not necessarily
instigate any activities. Once approved, all management activities must be
consistent with the LRMP. 8 Revision is required at least every fifteen years,
or more often as needed. 9
NFMA also requires that the Forest Service comply with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act2" (NEPA), a procedural statute that provides for govern-
ment analysis and public scrutiny of the environmental impacts of agency
decision-making.2' NEPA requires preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for any major federal action that significantly affects the
quality of the human environment.22 N MA requires forest plans be prepared
in accordance with NEPA, generally including preparation of an accompany-
ing EIS for every forest plan.23
However, neither NFMA nor NEPA contains a citizen suit provision, so
judicial review of agency decisions under these acts is accomplished through
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).24 Section 10(a) of the
APA provides that "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."25
The APA incorporates the ripeness doctrine by allowing judicial review of
agency action only when it is a "final agency action. 26 The Supreme Court
recently stated two conditions that must be met for an administrative action to
be considered final under the APA: (1) the action should mark the consumma-
tion of the agency's decisionmaking process, and (2) the action should be one
by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal
consequences flow. 27 Failure of an agency to act are also reviewable,28 and
courts may "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed."29
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1994).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1).
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
27. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
28. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (expanding the definition of "agency action" to include a "failure to act").
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1994 & Supp. I1/1997).
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C. Previous Challenges to LRMPs Decided on Ripeness Grounds
In 1990 the Supreme Court in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation" con-
strued the scope of judicial review under the APA of public land management
plans.3 Lujan involved an environmental group's challenge to the Bureau of
Land Management's (BLM) land withdrawal review program.32 The com-
plaint was based on alleged violations to the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976"3 (FLPMA) and NEPA. Like NFMA, FLPMA provides no
private right of action for violations of its provisions, so plaintiffs in Lujan
soughtjudicial review under section 10(a) of the APA.34 The Court addressed
the ripeness of this challenge, and held the program was not "agency action"
or "final agency action," within the meaning of the APA.35
The Court reasoned that the program of "land withdrawal" "does not refer
to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a completed universe of partic-
ular BLM orders and regulations," but simply refers to "the continuing (and
thus constantly changing) operations of the BLM."'36 The Court continued that
"a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action 'ripe' for
judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been
reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed
out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's situation
in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him.""
A major exception to the ripeness standard noted in Lujan "is a substantive
rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct
immediately." The Court stated that this type of agency action is ripe for
review.38 The Court acknowledged that the "case-by-case approach that this
requires is understandably frustrating to [environmental organizations seeking]
across-the-board protection of [natural resources]." However, the Court stated
that such a limitation is the "traditional" and "normal mode of operation of the
courts."'39 The Court said that unless Congress specifically provides for judi-
cial review "at a higher level of generality, we intervene only when.., a
specific 'final agency action' has an actual or immediately threatened effect."4 °
30. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
31. Beth Brennan & Matt Clifford, Standing, Ripeness, and Forest Plan Appeals, 17 PuB. LAND&
REs. L. REv. 125, 133-35 (1996).
32. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 875.
33. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
34. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882.
35. Id. at 890.
36. Il
37. IL at 891.
38. Id. (citing Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 152-54).
39. Id. at 894.
40. Id. (citing Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 158, 164-66 (1967)).
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By the mid-1990s the federal appeals courts' varying interpretations of
Lujan resulted in a 3-2 circuit split regarding the reviewability of LRMPs.4'
The Seventh42 and Ninth Circuits43 upheld such challenges, holding that the
controversies were ripe for review because the plans were final, appealable,
and presented threats of actual and imminent harm. The Eighth" and Eleventh
Circuits45 denied the justiciability of such claims on standing and ripeness
grounds, finding the plans were merely advisory documents intended to guide
site-specific decisions, and that allegations of injury were speculative prior to
site-specific implementation of the plans. This was the unsettled state of the
law regarding the ripeness of LRMP challenges when the Wayne National
Forest controversy reached the Sixth Circuit,46 and is likely the reason the
Supreme Court accepted the case for review.
I]J. OHIO FORESTRY
The planning process for the Wayne National Forest began in 1981.4' Two
environmental groups, the Sierra Club and the Citizens Council on Conserva-
tion and Environmental Control participated in the planning process and the
public comment period following publication of the proposed Plan and the
draft EIS.48 In 1988, the Forest Service adopted the final plan and accompany-
ing final EIS. 49 Both groups complained of the Plan's designation of suitable
41. Garrahan, supra note 4, at 172-74; Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 7, at 10622; Murphy, supra
note 15, at 243-50; Brennan & Clifford, supra note 31 at 141-48; and Miles A. Yanick, Loss of Protection
as Injury in Fact: An Approach to Establishing Standing to Challenge Environmental Planning Decisions,
29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 857, 865-873 (1996).
42. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7'h Cir. 1995). The court held a forest plan and its EIS were
ripe for review because they could cause imminent harm, regardless of their programmatic nature. Id. at
613-14. Further, the court distinguished Lujan on the basis that in this case the Forest Service had issued
a final, appealable plan. Id. at 614.
43. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9"' Cir. 1992). This court similarly
distinguished Lujan on both standing and ripeness grounds. Id. at 1517-19. See also Resources Ltd., Inc.
v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9" Cir. 1993) (reversing the lower courts holding that the challenged LRMP
was not ripe for review because there was no "actual or immediately threatened effect"); and Seattle
Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9' Cir. 1993) (finding that while logging might not occur under
the plan, potential harm to plaintiff's aesthetic and scientific interests in owls that inhabit the forest consti-
tuted imminent injury).
44. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8" h Cir. 1994). Here the court found the LRMP was a
programmatic document that did not "effectuate any on-the-ground environmental changes," and noted
that events would occur between the plan and site-specific projects, making any injury from the plan
merely speculative. Id. at 758.
45. Wilderness Soc'y, 83 F.3d at 390 (holding that the LRMP was not ripe for review prior to a
second stage site-specific decision).
46. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6" Cir. 1997), rev'd and vacated by Ohio Forestry, 523
U.S. 726 (1998).
47. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd by Thomas, 105 F.3d
248.
48. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 489.
49. Id.
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timber lands and harvest methods, and appealed the adoption of the Plan
through administrative channels." The Chief of the Forest Service denied the
groups' appeals in 1992 and affirmed adoption of the Plan, and the environ-
mental groups instigated legal action two months later. 1
The complaint included three counts.52 First, the groups alleged that ap-
proval of a plan that permits below-cost timber sales accomplished by
clearcutting violates NFMA, NEPA, and the APA 3 Second, they claimed that
by permitting below-cost timber sales, the Forest Service violated its duty as
a public trustee. 4 Third, the plaintiffs alleged that in selecting lands suitable
for timber production, the Forest Service failed to follow regulations requiring
it to properly identify "economically unsuitable lands," and as a result, the
agency categorized "economically unsuitable lands" as suitable for timber
production. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged that the regulations violated NFMA
and the APA as an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion, not in accor-
dance with law.56
The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the plan and the below-
cost timber sales and clearcutting it authorized were unlawful, and sought an
injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from allowing further timber harvest
or below-cost timber sales pending revision of the Plan.57
A. Procedural History
At the district court level, the parties did not raise the issue ofjusticiability,
and Judge James L. Graham granted summary judgment for the Forest Service
on the merits. 8 Judge Graham held that the plaintiffs "failed to show that in
adopting the Plan for the Wayne [National Forest], the Forest Service acted
arbitrarily or capriciously or that the Plan is contrary to law. 59
The plaintiffs appealed, and in Sierra Club v. Thomas, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in
holding that Forest Service LRMPs are ripe forjudicial review.P° The decision
first addressed the threshold issue ofjusticiability with a discussion of stand-
ing. The court stated that "[i]n cases involving Land Resource Management
Plans, the most controverted standing issue is whether the injury is immi-
50. Id.
51. ld.





57. Id. at 731-32.
58. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. at 503.
59. Id
60. Thomas, 105 F.3d at 250.
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nent."' The Sixth Circuit determined LRMPs "represent significant and
concrete decisions that play a critical role in future Forest Service actions,"
and stated that if the plaintiffs were only allowed to challenge the plan at the
site-specific stage, "then the meaningful citizen participation contemplated by
the [NFMA] 'would forever escape review."' 62 Then, specifically addressing
the ripeness of the controversy, the decision concluded "[p]laintiffs need not
wait to challenge a specific project when their grievance is with an overall
plan. ' 6
3
Turning to the merits of the plaintiffs' first and third claims, the court found
that the Forest Service's planning process was "improperly predisposed toward
clearcutting" and the resulting plan was "arbitrary and capricious because it
is based upon this artificial narrowing of options. '' 4 The court then engaged
in an extraordinary analysis of the planning process, accusing the Forest Ser-
vice of maintaining political and economic biases in favor of timber produc-
tion and undervaluing primitive recreational uses. 6 In a concurring opinion,
Judge Batchelder wrote that "speculation about the motives and biases of the
Forest Service, even if accurate, is unnecessary, and therefore, ought not to be
voiced in this opinion. 66 In conclusion, the court found the Forest Service
"failed to comply with the protective spirit of the [NFMA]," and that this
noncompliance violated § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v) of the Act.67
B. Supreme Court Decision
The Ohio Forestry Association was an intervenor-defendant in both lower
court cases, but maintained a low profile until the appellate court's decision
raised the stakes for the logging industry.6 8 The Ohio Forestry Association
petitioned for a writ of certiorari over the objections of the plaintiffs and,
surprisingly, the Forest Service, which argued against Supreme Court review
on procedural grounds.69 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in October,
1997, to determine whether the dispute presented ajusticiable controversy, and
if so, whether the LRMP conformed to statutory and regulatory requirements.
71
61. Id.
62. Id.. (quoting Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1516).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 251
65. Id. at 251-52.
66. Id. at 252 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
67. Id. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v) (1994) (requiring even-aged management practices (i.e.
clearcutting) be used in national forests only when consistent with the protection of soil, watershed, fish,
wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic resources, and the regeneration of the timber resource).
68. Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 7, at 10624.
69. Id.
70. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 732.
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In briefs and at oral argument, the Forest Service realigned itself with the
Ohio Forestry Association and argued that the suit was not justiciable because
the plaintiffs lacked standing and because the dispute over the plan' s specifica-
tions for logging and clearcutting was not yet ripe for judicial review.7" Be-
cause the Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and held the dispute was not
ripe for review, the decision did not discuss standing or the merits of the
case.
72
C. Reasoning and Analysis
In reaching its decision in Ohio Forestry, the Court relied primarily on two
prior ripeness decisions, Abbott Laboratories and Lujan. The Court modified
the two-prong ripeness test from Abbott Laboratories,73 and distilled it into
three factors.74 The first factor asks whether delayed review would cause the
plaintiff hardship. The second factor requires a determination of whether
judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administra-
tive action by the defendant. The third factor asks whether the courts would
benefit from further factual development of the issues presented.
In applying this standard, the Court first found that the plaintiffs failed to
show delayed review would cause them hardship. The Court stated the chal-
lenged LRMP does not "create any adverse effects of a strictly legal kind, that
is, effects of a sort that traditionally would have qualified as harm," since
LRMPs "do not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing
anything."76 To illustrate, the Court said "the Plan does not give anyone a
legal right to cut trees, nor does it abolish anyone's legal authority to object to
trees' being Cut. '77 The Court also found that the plan could not inflict imme-
diate harm because several steps were required before the Forest Service could
initiate any site-specific activity based on the plan, and plaintiffs could bring
a challenge then.71 Plaintiffs contended that the expense of multiple site-spe-
cific challenges required by delayed review, would constitute hardship.79 The
Court responded that "this kind of litigation cost-saving" is insufficient to
justify review of an otherwise unripe case, because the disadvantages of pre-
mature review outweigh the additional costs. 0
71. Id.
72. Ma. See also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
74. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733.
75. Id.
76. Id. (paraphrasing U.S. v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 734.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 735. The Court then quoted Lujan for further justification of the case-by-case approach.
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Second, the Court found immediate review would interfere with further
agency action by hindering the Forest Service's efforts to refine its policies,
correct its own mistakes, and apply its own expertise. 81 The Court added that
"further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is implemented," and
hearing the challenge now would "interfere with the system that Congress
specified for the agency to reach forest logging decisions."82
Third, the Court found that immediate review "would require time-consum-
ingj udicial consideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan"
with effects that may change over time.83 The decision stated that this is the
type of "'abstract disagreement over administrative policies that the ripeness
doctrine seeks to avoid," and it would be best to wait until the controversy was
"reduced to more manageable proportions," and its "factual components
[were] fleshed out" to "significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal
issues presented."84
The Court also addressed the legislative intent behind NFMA, differentiat-
ing it from NEPA and other environmental statutes where Congress has specif-
ically allowed for judicial review prior to enforcement.85 The Ohio Forestry
opinion distinguishes substantive challenges to LRMPs under NFMA from
procedural challenges under NEPA, stating that NEPA "guarantees a particular
procedure, not a particular result., 86 The purpose of NEPA is to insure that
environmental effects of government agency actions are discovered and con-
sidered before action is taken.87 In Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, the
Ninth Circuit illustrated this point, recognizing that when an agency does not
follow procedures required by NEPA, the "risk that environmental impact will
be overlooked" is the injury inflicted.88 In Ohio Forestry, the Court stated that
a procedural challenge brought by a plaintiff who is injured by a failure to
comply with NEPA "may complain of that failure at the time the failure takes
place, for the claim can never get riper."89
81. Id. (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232,242 (1980)).
82. Id. at 735-36.
83. Id. at 735.
84. Id. at 736-37 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 148, Lujan, 497
U.S. at 891, and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'I Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 82 (1978)).
85. Id. at 737.
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
88. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514.
89. Ohio Foresry, 523 U.S. at 737. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court illustrates this point
in terms of standing, stating "[tihus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare
an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the statement
will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed for many
years." 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
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In a final attempt to avoid dismissal for lack of ripeness, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the opening of trails to motorized travel and coinciding failure to
promote backcountry recreation in areas designated for logging are harms that
will occur now." However, the complaint did not include these claims, so the
Court declined to address them.9' But the Court did state that the Govern-
ment's brief and the Solicitor General, at oral argument, conceded that con-
cerns of immediate harm resulting from the plan would be justiciable?2 The
Court pointed to the Government's concession that if the plaintiffs "had previ-
ously raised these kinds of harm, the ripeness analysis in this case with respect
to those provisions of the Plan that produce the harm would be significantly
different."93 Also, the Court's statement that the plaintiffs could not point to
"any other way in which the Plan could now force it to modify its behavior in
order to avoid future adverse consequences,"94 implicitly recognizes that when
a plaintiff can show a forest plan forces such a modification, the plan, or a part
of it, may be ripe for review. Lujan supports this view, finding that elements
of a plan that require claimants to immediately adjust their behavior are ripe.95
The Court in Ohio Forestry, added "[a]ny such later challenge might also
include a challenge to the lawfulness of the present Plan if (but only if) the
present Plan then matters, i.e., if the Plan plays a causal role with respect to the
future, then-imminent, harm from logging."96
Despite the Court's closing out review of substantive provisions of LRMPs
on the facts presented, Ohio Forestry expressed dicta that leave open two
avenues to challenge LRMPs: 1) claims of procedural harm, and 2) claims of
substantive defects in a plan where injuries are not contingent on some activity
requiring a second stage of decision making after the plan's adoption. The
Court's reasoning and the foregoing analysis suggest site-specific allegations
of imminent harm are necessary to claimants taking the second avenue, but not
the first. Subsequent LRMP cases interpreting Ohio Forestry demonstrate
apparent confusion over the characterization of claims as procedural or sub-
stantive, and when site-specific allegations of imminent harm are required.
IV. LRMP CASES INTERPRETING OHIO FORESTRY
In recent cases involving LRMP challenges, several federal courts have
found claims of procedural harm and substantive claims of imminent, site-
specific harm justiciable in light of Ohio Forestry. The Ninth Circuit has
90. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738.
91. lMi
92. Id at 739.
93. Id at 738.
94. Id. at 734.
95. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
96. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734.
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declined to join these courts, relying in part on Ohio Forestry to deny the
ripeness of challenges to the Forest Service's failure to follow the monitoring
requirements of its own LRMPs. Strict adherence to Ohio Forestry is mis-
placed in the Ninth Circuit cases due to the simple distinction that they do not
involve challenges to a substantive provision of an LRMP, but rather challenge
the agency's failure to adhere to a forest plan. Further, if Ohio Forestry is
correctly applied, such challenges should be characterized as procedural
claims and allowed without requiring site-specific allegations.
A. Federal District Court Cases
In Kentucky Heartwood, Inc. v. Worthington,97 environmental groups sought
to prevent certain logging activities in eastern Kentucky's Daniel Boone Forest
until the Forest Service complied with applicable law, administrative regula-
tions, and the provisions of the Forest Plan.98 The plaintiffs asserted four
separate claims. First, they alleged the agency violated the ESA's requirement
of consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service in adopting the Plan, nine
amendments to the Plan and three management policies which authorized
projects that could have affected listed species. 99 Second, the plaintiffs claim-
ed the Forest Service's failure to consider alternatives to clearcutting violated
NEPA requirement that the agency study, develop, and describe appropriate
alternatives in the EIS that accompanied the Forest Plan. ° Third, the plain-
tiffs argued that the agency violated NFMA's requirement that amendments
and policies supplemental to the Forest Plan go through the NEPA process
before they can legally guide management activities in the forest.' 0 ' Finally,
they challenged the Forest Plan's adoption of clearcutting as the exclusive
timber harvest method, claiming it violated NFMA, which does not allow
exclusive use of clearcutting.° 2
After a lengthy discussion of the facts and holding in Ohio Forestry, District
Court Judge Forester characterized the plaintiffs' first three claims as proce-
dural and held that their ESA and NEPA challenges to the Forest Plan were
ripe, and that their NFMA claim was also ripe "as it relates to defendants'
failure to comply with a particular procedure."' 3 However, Judge Forester
dismissed the NFMA challenge to the Forest Plan's authorization of clearcutt-
97. 20 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
98. Id. at 1088.
99. Kentucky Heartwood, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. The duty to consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service is found at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. 1999) and 50 C.F.R. § 402.11,-14 (1999). The Daniel Boone
Forest is home to at least thirty-three threatened or endangered species of plants and animals. Id. at 1081 -
82.
100. Id. at 1088.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1090.
20001 JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OFFORESTPLANS 93
ing as the exclusive harvest method, stating that challenges to the content of
forest plans brought pursuant to NFMA are not justiciable in light of Ohio
Forestry. 14
Kentucky Heartwood applies the Ohio Forestry decision's acceptance of
procedural challenges to LRMPs. It also demonstrates that not all claims
brought under NFMA need necessarily be characterized as substantive.
Though the Court in Ohio Forestry made a rough distinction between NEPA
claims as procedural and NFMA claims as substantive, this court found that
NFMA and ESA claims may also be procedural in nature.
The plaintiffs in Oregon Natural Resources CouncilAction v. United States
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management"°5 claimed that the federal
agencies violated their own LRMP.'" The LRMP in this case was the North-
west Forest Plan, adopted in 1994 in response to concerns over the manage-
ment of federal forests within the geographic range of the northern spotted
owl. 7 The Plan sought to ensure the viability of certain rare species by re-
quiring surveys for those species before any ground-disturbing activities im-
plemented after a specific cut-off date.1"8 The agencies issued memoranda
exempting a timber sale from survey requirements when the sale's EIS was
completed before the applicable cut-off date, or when the sale was to take
place in an area of abundant red tree vole habitat or isolated watersheds under
private ownership." The plaintiffs claimed that the agencies' authorization
of certain timber sales without first conducting surveys for certain species of
wildlife, as required by the LRMP,"0 violated NFMA and FLPMA and their
implementing regulations which require timber sales be consistent with guid-
ing LRMPs.'" The plaintiffs also alleged a NEPA violation because signifi-
cant new information had come to light which the agencies failed to address
by preparing a supplemental EIS 2 as required by NEPA and its implementing
regulations. "3
District Court Judge Dwyer characterized the plaintiffs' claims as proce-
dural because they sought to enforce a procedural requirement that, if disre-
104. Id. (noting that Ohio Forestry distinguishes NEPA from NFMA on the grounds that former
requires a particular procedure, while the latter requires a particular result. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737).
105. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
106. Ia at 1087.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1088.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (1994), and 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (1999); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1994);
43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3 (1999).
112. ONRC, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994), 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1999).
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garded, could impair their concrete interests. "4 The agencies and intervening
timber companies argued that these claims were not final agency actions and
not ripe for review under Ohio Forestry.15 Judge Dwyer found the NEPA
claims ripe for review under section 706(1) of the APA, which has been char-
acterized as "an exception to the final agency action requirement.""' 6 The
agencies' decision to authorize the timber sales without surveys constituted
final agency actions under section 704 of the APA.17 Judge Dwyer also found
the plaintiffs' challenge to specific timber sales rendered the claim ripe in light
of Ohio Forestry."8
Like Kentucky Heartwood, Oregon Natural Resources Council Action also
stands for the proposition that procedural claims, including those based on
FLPMA and NFMA as well as NEPA, should be considered ripe under Ohio
Forestry. In addition, the case shows that an agency decision to disregard the
requirements of a LRMP is reviewable as a final agency action or failure to act
for the purposes of the APA. Finally, Judge Dwyer' s opinion demonstrates the
perceived need for site-specific allegations in order to square this type of
challenge with the mandates of Ohio Forestry, even when the claim is proce-
dural in nature.
In Kern v. United States Bureau of Land Management,' 9 the plaintiffs
challenged the BLM's Resource Management Plan (RMP) for the Coos Bay
district of federal lands managed by the agency in Oregon. 2' The plaintiffs
alleged violations of FLPMA and the APA, arguing that the BLM' s environ-
mental review procedures were inadequate with regards to the threat that
logging and road-building activities would spread a root disease that is fatal
to Port Orford cedar trees. 2 ' The plaintiffs had previously challenged the
BLM management guidelines for these same trees for failure to consider as
alternatives the prohibition of logging and road building in watersheds infected
with the disease. '2 2 However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dis-
missed the challenge stating that the guidelines did not pose site-specific activ-
114. ONRC, 59 F. Supp. 2dat 1089. The court found thatlogging without the required surveys and thus
without knowledge of the number and location of critical species (like the northern spotted owl and the red
tree vole that the owl feeds on) may cause permanent harm to the species, and thus to the plaintiffs inter-
ests. Id.
115. Id. at 1090
116. Id. (quoting ONRC v. BLM, 150 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9h Cir. 1998)).
117. Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)).
118. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F. 3d 1, 6 (11 h Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff was "entitled to
challenge the Forest Service s compliance with the [forest] Plan as part of its site-specific challenge to the
timber sales" Id.)).
119. 38 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Or. 1999).
120. Id. at 1176.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1177.
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ities or call for any action which would directly impact the physical environ-
ment."z
In this case, District Court Judge Hogan characterized the plaintiffs'
FLPMA claims as general challenges to the RMP asserting that the BLM
failed to perform duties required by the Act and the Plan itself. 24 Judge Ho-
gan found the claims were not focused on any site-specific project and held
that they were not ripe for review."z He also stated that in this case the BLM
must conduct an environmental review before any site-specific projects go
forward.'26 However, Judge Hogan cited Ohio Forestry for the proposition
that such a challenge would be ripe where plan level directives would go
forward without additional consideration and would result in imminent con-
crete injury.27 The opinion also stated that "to the extent that the RMP plays
a role in site-specific decisions challenged elsewhere in the complaint, the
court will consider the adequacy of the RMP to the extent that it plays a causal
role with respect to the alleged harm."'28  Kern, like Oregon Natural Re-
sources CouncilAction, demonstrates that courts read Ohio Forestry as abso-
lutely requiring a site-specific complaint. In line with the dicta of Ohio For-
estry, this decision also expressly recognizes the potential ripeness of chal-
lenges to aspects of a LRMP that will cause immediate injury to a plaintiffs
interests.
B. Federal Circuit Court Cases
1. D.C. Circuit
In Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Service2 9, a collection
of environmental groups challenged a Forest Service decision authorizing oil
and gas leasing of land in the Shoshone National Forest in northwestern Wyo-
ming.3 ° The plaintiffs argued the agency violated its own regulations govern-
ing the leases and violated NEPA by authorizing the leases without first deter-
mining whether an adequate site specific environmental review had been
performed.13'
The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 governs the
issuance of oil and gas leases in national forests.'32 In 1990, the Forest Service
123. Northcoast Environmental Center v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 670 (9th Cir. 1998).
124. Kern, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738-39).
128. Id. (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734).
129. 165 F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
130. Id. at45.
131. Id.
132. Wyoming Outdoor Council, 165 F.3d at 45 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 226(g)-(h) (Supp. 1999)).
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promulgated regulations implementing its responsibilities under the Act.
33
The regulations require that Forest Service authorization of leases be subject
to three site-specific factual findings made by the agency. 34 First, the Forest
Service must verify that leasing of the specific lands has been adequately
addressed in a NEPA document and is consistent with the forest's LRMP.'35
If the agency determines that NEPA has not been satisfied or further environ-
mental assessment is necessary, additional analysis must be done before a
leasing decision is made for specific lands.'36 Second, the agency must ensure
that conditions of surface use are stipulated in any resulting lease.' Third,
the Forest Service must determine that the proposed surface use is allowable
somewhere on the land subject to leasing.' 38
In the EIS and the record of decision (ROD) for the proposed leases, the
Forest Service found NEPA compliance was adequate, but expressly stated
that it was not making any of the required findings.' 39 The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the agency's failure to include the required findings in the EIS and
ROD in district court, claiming this violated the agency's regulations and
NEPA. 40 The district court found for the defendants, deferring to the agency's
interpretation of its own regulations and finding that the Forest Service's EIS
was sufficiently site-specific that it did not violate NEPA. 4' This appeal by
the plaintiffs followed. Before the appeal was heard, the agency completed the
NEPA process, made the required findings, and authorized the BLM to lease
three parcels in the Shoshone National Forest.1
42
After a discussion of the Constitution's Article I jurisdictional require-
ments, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia focused on the prn-
dential concern of ripeness, and applied the Ohio Forestry three-part test."'
With the benefit of hindsight, the court held the "point of irreversible and
irretrievable commitment of resources and the concomitant obligation to fully
comply with NEPA [did] not mature until the leases [were] issued," and thus
the claim was unripe at the time the plaintiffs filed their appeal. " The court
went on to say that the plaintiffs could challenge the Service's NEPA compli-
ance after the BLM issued the leases.'45
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e)(1) (1999)).
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(c)(1), (e)(2)).
138. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 228.102(e)(3)).
139. Id. at47




143. Id. at 47-49. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 726.
144. Id. at 49.
145. Id. at 50.
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In contrast, the court characterized the plaintiffs' claim that the agency
violated its own regulations by issuing the EIS and ROD without completing
the required findings as procedural. 46 The court stated that where an agency
promulgates regulations that erect a procedural barrier and then ignores them,
the plaintiff need only show that the government act performed without the
procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a particularized interest of
the plaintiff. 47 Then, quoting Ohio Forestry, the court went on to say that a
person injured by an agency's failure to comply with a procedural requirement
may complain of the failure when it occurs, because the claim can never get
riper.
148
Wyoming Outdoor Council treats ripeness as a prudential requirement and
shows that all NEPA-based challenges to LRMPs are not necessarily ripe in
light of Ohio Forestry. However, this decision explicitly recognizes the proce-
dural nature and ripeness of an agency decision to ignore its own implement-
ing regulations. By finding an agency decision to ignore the procedural re-
quirements of its own regulations ripe for review, the D.C. Circuit implies that
such a decision is a final agency action or failure to act under the APA.
2. Eleventh Circuit
In Sierra Club v. Martin,49 environmental groups challenged the Forest
Service's approval of seven timber sales in the Chattahoochee and Oconee
National Forests in the Appalachian Mountains of northern Georgia. 5 ' The
proposed timber sales would cover roughly 2,000 acres, require the construc-
tion of eighteen miles of roads, and release over 155 tons of sediment into
nearby streams.' 5 ' The LRMP under which the timber sales were approved
was adopted in 1985 and amended in 1989.52 Prior to any timber sale, the
plan required the Forest Service to conduct a site-specific study to determine
whether the sale would harm the area or its resident species. 53 After studying
the area of the proposed sales, the agency determined there would be no ad-
verse impact and approved the sales. 54
The plaintiffs alleged that the agency's decision to approve the sales was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the Service did not obtain or
consider population data for sensitive species and species proposed or listed
under the ESA, as required by the Forest Plan and the agency's own regula-
146. Ia at51.
147. Id. (quoting Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
148. Id. (quoting Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737).
149. 168 F.3d 1 (1 a Cir. 1999) reh'g denied, Sierra Club v. Martin, 181 F.3d 111 (1 lh Cir. 1999).




154. Id. at 2-3.
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tions.'55 The plaintiffs claimed the failure to acquire population data violated
NFMA's implementing regulations as well.'56 The plaintiffs also challenged
the Forest Plan itself, arguing that by allowing such timber harvests, it violated
NFMA' s requirement that the plan adequately protect the soil, watershed, fish
and wildlife of the Forest.'57
The district court granted summaryjudgment to the defendants, holding that
the Forest Service was not required to obtain population data before approving
timber sales. 58 With respect to the first claim, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Service's failure to gather the population data
was contrary to the Forest Plan and consequently that the decision to authorize
the sales without the data was arbitrary and capricious. 59 In response to the
second claim, the Forest Service argued that NFMA's implementing regula-
tions could not be challenged at the site-specific level because they apply only
to the forest planning process. 60 Further, the agency argued that the plan itself
was not a final agency action and could not be challenged.' 6 ' The court agreed
that the regulations apply only to the planning process but noted that the plan-
ning process did not end with the plan's approval, because NFMA's imple-
menting regulations require plan revision under various circumstances.
62
Then without citing Ohio Forestry, the court held that the environmental
groups could challenge the Forest Service's compliance with its own LRMP
as a part of their site-specific challenge to the timber sales.' 63 The court recog-
nized that a contrary result would make it impossible for a plaintiff to ever
seek review of the Forest Service's compliance with a Forest Plan. 64 Instead
of relying on Ohio Forestry, the court looked to its own decision in Wilderness
Society v. Alcock for the proposition that a court can hear a challenge to a
forest plan once a site-specific action is proposed. 6 The decision did not
address the plaintiffs' challenge to the plan itself.
Martin also treats a Forest Service decision to ignore its own LRMP' s moni-
toring requirements, which derive from regulations implementing NFMA, as
final for purposes of judicial review under APA. It is important to note that
in Martin, the Eleventh Circuit did not uphold or declare ripe a challenge to
the content of a LRMP. The court merely held that a claimant could seek
review of the Forest Service's compliance with a forest plan it had already




159. Id. at 5.





165. Id. (citing Wilderness Soc'y, 83 F.3d at 390).
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adopted. While the court also required a site-specific complaint, it did so in
reliance on a case other than Ohio Forestry.
3. Fifth Circuit
In Sierra Club v. Peterson,166 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit addressed the same issue in a case virtually identical to Martin.
In fact, the Fifth Circuit expressly agreed with the holding and reasoning of its
"sister circuit" in Martin.67 While the Eleventh Circuit declined the opportu-
nity to reconcile the holding with Ohio Forestry, the Fifth Circuit had no
choice. In response to a vigorous dissent on the ripeness issue, the majority
.was forced to distinguish the instant case from Lujan and Ohio Forestry.168
Peterson is the most recent decision in a fourteen-year dispute between
environmental groups and the Forest Service over the management of four
National Forests in eastern Texas. 69 In 1985, the environmental groups first
challenged the Forest Service's management of these National Forests in
response to the agency's timber cutting in wilderness areas to control the
spread of the southern pine beetle. 7' In 1987, the groups' efforts diverged into
two distinct tracks of litigation.'7' The first involved claims that clearcutting
violated NFMA and its associated regulations. 7 ' The second involved at-
tempts by the environmental groups to protect the habitat of the red-cockaded
woodpecker. 173 This case sits at the end of the first track.'74
The environmental groups claimed that the Forest Service's use of
clearcutting in site-specific areas violated NFMA with respect to its mandate
that the agency protect the diversity of plant and animal communities and
protect resources in the national forests. 75 The plaintiffs also argued that the
Service's practices violated NFMA, the agency's implementing regulations,
and the forests' LRMP requirements of inventorying and monitoring for diver-
sity and resource protection. 76 The district court found that it had jurisdiction
to review the Forest Service's failure to implement timber sales in compliance
with NFMA and its regulations and concluded this failure was a final agency
action for the purposes of the APA. 177 The plaintiffs prevailed on the merits
166. 185 F.3d 349 (5-h Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc granted, Sierra Club v. Peterson, 240 F.3d 580 (5'
Cir. 2000).
167. Id. at 372-73.
168. Id. at 362-64.
169. Id. at 353.





175. Id. at 357. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(B), (F)(v) (1994).
176. Id.
177. IL at 358 (citing Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905, 914-15 (E.D. Tex. 1997)).
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and the district court enjoined future timber harvest until the Forest Service
complied with NFMA. The agency and intervening timber interests ap-
pealed. 7
After upholding the district court's finding that the environmental groups
had standing, the majority opinion for the Court of Appeals commenced a
lengthy discussion of ripeness and final agency action, in which it distin-
guished the present case from Lujan and Ohio Forestry.179 First, the majority
noted that in Lujan, "the plaintiffs challenged everything about the BLM's
policies from soup to nuts, not a site-specific individual policy."'8 ° Here, the
plaintiffs "pointed to specific activities on specific plots ... and challenged the
mechanism by which the Forest Service determined how to approve those
discrete logging practices."'' The majority cited with approval Justice
Scalia's observation in Lujan that a case would be ripe where a specific final
agency action has an actual or immediately threatened effect which may re-
quire even a whole program to be revised by the agency to avoid an unlawful
result. 18
2
Ohio Forestry, according to the majority, was both easily distinguished and
supportive of finding the present case ripe for review.' 83 In the present case,
the plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service violated its regulations and NFMA
when it approved even-aged management on site-specific timber sales without
fulfilling the LRMP's requirement that management indicator species be in-
ventoried or monitored in order to assess the impact of various harvesting
techniques.' 84 Whereas in Ohio Forestry, no logging was yet authorized pur-
suant to the LRMP, and the Forest Service had not even reached the point of
implementing its LRMP or NFMA "on-the-ground" when the suit was
brought.' 85 The majority opined that Ohio Forestry supports the proposition
that "disagreements over final, specific action are necessarily ripe."'86
Though the majority extolled the importance of the site-specific aspect of
the challenge to satisfy Ohio Forestry and the ripeness doctrine, at one point
its opinion characterized the Service's decision not to follow the Forest Plan's
monitoring requirements (rather than the approval of the timber sales) as the
final agency action that rendered the claimjusticiable.8 7 The majority recog-
nized the Forest Service's decision not to follow the inventory and monitoring
178. Id. at 359.
179. Id. at361-73.
180. Id. at 363.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894).




187. Id. at 371-72 n.31.
20001 JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF FOREST PLANS 101
requirements of the LRMP as an "adjudication" representing a "failure to act"
which satisfies the "final agency action" requirement of the APA.'88 The
majority summarized its reasoning for this characterization and the propriety
of the plaintiffs' challenge as follows:
The Forest Service determined that it would conduct timber sales
from trees growing in Texas's National Forests; it considered two
alternative means of harvesting the trees -- even-aged and un-
even-aged timber management; it was aware of the regulations that
required it to inventory and to monitor species that would be af-
fected by even-aged timber management practices; it affirmatively
decided not to follow those regulations; it engaged in even-aged
management; it conducted timber sales subsequent to those prac-
tices. When the Forest Service elected not to follow those regula-
tions, it undertook a final agency action for the purposes of the
inventorying and monitoring that the regulations prescribed. Fail-
ure to follow those regulations is what the Appellees challenged.189
Accordingly, Peterson explicitly allows a single challenge to multiple tim-
ber sales without any discussion of the different site-specific effects at the
various and individual sales, further demonstrating that it is the decision itself
that is important, not the "on-the-ground" effects of the Service's decision not
to monitor. 'I In light of this characterization and the fact that the plaintiffs
challenged the Service's failure to follow the mandates of its forest plan rather
than the plan itself, reliance on Ohio Forestry and the perceived need to distin-
guish or justify this decision seems unnecessary.
4. Ninth Circuit
Ecology Center, Inc. v. United States Forest Service9' involved a challenge
to a Forest Service decision not to follow the monitoring requirements of its
LRMP for the Kootenai National Forest in Northwest Montana. 92 This chal-
lenge was similar to Martin and Peterson, but the plaintiffs did not complain
of site-specific timber sales made under the LRMP. In a brief opinion, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Ecology Center's action, holding
that the court lacked subject matterjurisdiction because the challenge was not
ripe for adjudication since the Forest Service's failure to perform certain moni-
188. Id.
189. Id. at 370-71 (additional emphasis added).
190. Id. at 370-72.
191. 192 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1999).
192. Id. at925.
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toring tasks was not a final agency action or a justiciable failure to act under
the APA as interpreted by Ohio Forestry.'93
Under the APA, the plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's failure to
comply with monitoring duties imposed by NFMA, its implementing regula-
tions, and the Kootenai National Forest Plan.'94 The plan was adopted in 1987
and required the agency to produce annual, biannual and five-year reports
containing monitoring data for recreation trends, wildlife habitat and popula-
tions, species listed under the ESA, and the like.'95 In 1996, the Ecology
Center filed suit alleging that the agency failed to publish the required reports
in 1988 and 1993, and that the required monitoring was insufficient in the
reports it did file. 196 The Forest Service acknowledged its failure to publish
reports for those two years and admitted that the reports it did publish con-
tained inadequate data for some parameters. 1 7 However, the magistratejudge
for the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matterjurisdiction
and never reached the merits of the dispute.198
For the Ninth Circuit, resolution of thejurisdictional issue hinged on wheth-
er the agency's failure to adequately monitor was either a final agency action
or an action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed under the APA. 9
The court classified monitoring and reporting as advisory steps leading to an
agency decision.2" The court recognized that monitoring was mandatory
under the LRMP, but relying on Ohio Forestry, found that legal consequences
did not flow and rights or obligations did not arise from the decision not to
follow the requirements of the plan.2°' Ohio Forestry, the court suggested,
requires plaintiffs to withhold their challenge until "a time when harm is more
imminent and more certain. 2 °2 While the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege
imminent harm from a site-specific activity, the Ecology Center argued that it
suffered actionable injury because the inadequate monitoring deprived it of
information necessary to effectively oversee agency activities provided for by
NFMA. °3 The court countered that NFMA does not provide for public over-
sight of monitoring, only of the formation, amendment and revision of
LRMPs. 204 The plaintiffs argued that denial of this claim would essentially
193. Id. at 925-26.
194. Id. at 923.




199. Id. at 924-26.
200. Id. at 925.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734).
203. Id. at 925.
204. Id. at 926 and n. 7.
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preventjudicial review of inadequate momtoring by the agency 205 The court
stated that such claims would be justiciable when linked to an APA challenge
to a final agency action like a timber sale.206
The court then addressed the Ecology Center's claim that the failure to
monitor was ripe for review under the APA as an agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.2 7 This provision of the APA, the court
maintained, applies only when there is a genuine failure to act, and not when
the Forest Service "merely failed to conduct its duty in strict conformance with
the Plan and NFMA regulations. 208
Ecology Center demonstrates unnecessary application of Ohio Forestry in
a case similar to Martin and Peterson, where the challenge was not to a
LRMP, but to the Forest Service's failure to follow the plan's requirements.
The decision also illustrates the perceived necessity for allegations of site-
specific injury, like a timber sale, upon which the court can base a finding of
imminent harm. Application of tis requirement is misplaced when the plain-
tiffs' claim in this case could easily be characterized as an allegation of proce-
dural harm, which even Ohio Forestry recognizes to be ripe upon occurrence,
and not dependant on further allegations of site-specific harm. The agency's
failure to momtor, as mandated by the Forest Plan, will prevent effective
amendment and revision of the Plan, as well as informed resource allocation
decisions like timber sales.
Wilderness Society v. Thomas 9 required the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit to decide whether the Forest Service violated NFMA in preparing a
LRMP for the Prescott National Forest in central Arizona."0 The final
Prescott National Forest Plan identified a total amount of land not physically
"capable" of sustaining commercial grazing.2 A coalition of environmental
groups filed suit, claiming in count one that the Plan violated NFMA and
Forest Service regulations which also require a separate analysis to determine
if lands physically "capable" of sustaining grazing are also "suitable" for
grazing, taking into account economic and environmental considerations, as
well as alternative uses for the land. 12 The plaintiffs also made site-specific
challenges, alleging in counts two and three that the agency violated NFMA
when it issued grazing permits for two grazing allotments pursuant to the plan.
205. Id. at 926 n. 6.
206. Id. at 926 (citing Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9' Cir. 1998) (allow-
ing a challenge to a timber sale on grounds that the Forest Service violated its forest plan when it failed to
monitor trout populations in a stream affected by the sale)).
207. Id. at 926.
208. Id.
209. 188 F.3d 1130 (9' Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 1132.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1132-33.
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The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the appeal
-followed.213
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion by applying the Ohio Forestry three-
part test to determine the ripeness of the plaintiffs' claims. 4 The court then
acknowledged that Ohio Forestry allows challenges to a forest plan when
plaintiffs allege either imminent, concrete injuries that would be caused by the
plan, or a site-specific injury causally related to an alleged defect in the plan. 21 5
The Court characterized count one as "a generic challenge [to a forest plan]
that Ohio Forestry cautions against adjudicating" and held it unripe for review
despite the court's explicit acknowledgment of its causal relationship to the
site-specific injuries alleged in counts two and three.216 The court then found
counts two and three ripe for judicial review and stated that "[b]ecause the
site-specific injury to the two [grazing] allotments is alleged to have been
caused by a defect in the Forest Plan, we may consider whether the Forest
Service complied with NFMA in making its general its general grazing suit-
ability determinations in the Forest Plan. 21 7
Wilderness Society suggests that Ecology Center would have been decided
differently had it included allegations of site-specific injury. In Wilderness
Society, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the justiciability of Forest
Service noncompliance with a forest plan, when the failure to comply causes
site-specific harm. Contrary to the holding in Ecology Center, this suggests
that noncompliance with the mandates of a forest plan is a final agency action
orjusticiable failure to act for purposes of the APA. The Wilderness Society
decision also unnecessarily extends the Ohio Forestry requirement of site-
specific harm to what is more properly characterized as a procedural claim.
Friends Of The Kalmiopsis v. United States Forest Service28 is a memoran-
dum decision issued by the Ninth Circuit involving a challenge by environ-
mental groups to the Forest Service's handling of off-road vehicle (ORV)
impacts in the Siskiyou National Forest in southwest Oregon and northwest
California.219 The plaintiffs claimed first that the Forest Service violated
NFMA by failing to amend or revise the Forest LRMP to address new infor-
mation pertaining to the spread of disease fatal to Port Orford cedar trees.
Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the Service violated an executive order and
the agency's own implementing regulations by its failure to adequately moni-
tor ORV impacts and prepare annual reviews of the Forest's ORV manage-
213. Id. at 1133.
214. Id. (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733).
215. Id. at 1133-34 (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738-39).
216. Id. at 1134.
217. Id.
218. 198 F.3d 253 (9 h Cir. 1999).
219. Id. at 253.
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ment plan. Finally, the environmental groups claimed that the agency's viola-
tion of its own wet-season road closure was arbitrary and capricious.22°
The court found the agency's "lax monitoring unlikely to expose potential
problems caused by ORVs."2"' However, the court found the claim unripe for
review under the APA because there was no complete failure to perform a
legally required duty that is necessary to constitute a final agency action or
failure to act.222 The agency and the court conceded that in light of Ohio For-
estry, these claims would be ripe for review if the harm was made more immi-
nent by a Forest Service attempt to revise its Forest Plan or designate ORV
areas without adequate monitoring.2 In this case, however, the court found
no imminent agency action that hinged on the result of the allegedly deficient
monitoring results and annual plan review.224
In Friends Of The Kalmiopsis, the Ninth Circuit again addressed ripeness
of claims brought under the APA which allege Forest Service failure to ade-
quately fulfill monitoring requirements. Here, the court relied on Ohio For-
estry and expressly stated that such claims would be ripe if the Forest Service
made the harm more imminent by taking site-specific action based on inade-
quate monitoring. This suggests that the court actually focused on Ohio For-
estry's imminence requirement and not the finality of an agency decision to
disregard mandatory regulations. However, Ohio Forestry involved a chal-
lenge to substantive provisions of an LRMP, which is easily distinguished
from cases challenging agency interpretation and implementation of LRMP
provisions. While a generic (non-site-specific) challenge to an LRMP may
indeed benefit from the focus provided by imminent site-specific harm, chal-
lenges to agency interpretation and implementation of regulations are more
akin to the procedural claims that Ohio Forestry recognizes as ripe when they
occur.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Forestry decision is a serious blow to environmental plaintiffs,
and it is tempting to read its holding as closing the courthouse door to all
challenges to LRMPs. However, more careful inspection of the dicta reveals
that the Court left two doors open, and study of the subsequent case law shows
that plaintiffs in lower court decisions after Ohio Forestry have taken advan-
tage of these doors.
First, Ohio Forestry reaffirms, from Lujan, the justiciability of challenges
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itly recognizes only procedural claims brought under NEPA, subsequent cases
show that such claims are also viable under NFMA, FLPMA, and the ESA.
Second, Justice Breyer's opinion affirms the ripeness of claims for injuries
that are not contingent on a timber sale, or some other activity that requires a
second stage of decision making. However, it is doubtful that challenges to
LRMPs based on such claims will result in wholesale review of the entire plan.
Rather, language in Ohio Forestry along with prior and subsequent cases
suggest that courts will review only portions of the plan with a causal relation-
ship to the harm. It should also be noted that Ohio Forestry and subsequent
cases treat ripeness as a prudential and discretionary limitation on the
justiciability of claims. Therefore, some variation should be expected in
courts' application of the doctrine to different LRMPs.
Cases interpreting Ohio Forestry have generally recognized that the pruden-
tial concerns of ripeness are satisfied both by challenges to procedural require-
ments and claims of imminent harm not contingent on the outcome of further
agency decision-making. These cases also demonstrate that courts give Ohio
Forestry's requirement of site-specific allegations of harm talismanic signifi-
cance even in the absence of a rational basis for such a requirement, and con-
trary to the language of Ohio Forestry.
Application of the Ohio Forestry requirement of site-specific allegations is
unwarranted in challenges brought against agencies for failure to properly
follow or implement portions of LRMPs, because they are only tangentially
related to Ohio Forestry and are easily distinguishable on the simple fact that
they are not challenges to forest plans. Reliance on Ohio Forestry in such
cases is problematic at best, and is likely to continue to lead to inconsistent
and unfair decisions like Ecology Center.
If anything, Ohio Forestry and Lujan stand for the proposition that cases
regarding a failure to monitor or otherwise follow LRMP guidelines do not
require allegations of site-specific harm. While Ohio Forestry equated proce-
dural challenges with NEPA, subsequent courts have recognized that claims
brought under NFMA, FLPMA, and the ESA may also be procedural in nature.
Ohio Forestry's statement that challenges to an agency's failure to follow
procedural requirements are necessarily ripe, assumes that such a failure con-
stitutes a "final agency action" or an action "unlawfully withheld or unreason-
ably delayed" for purposes of the APA.
Monitoring requirements, imposed by regulations implementing NFMA and
forest plans prepared pursuant to those regulations, are essentially procedural
requirements. Like NEPA, monitoring requirements guarantee particular
procedures, not specific results. The injury inflicted by an agency's failure to
follow monitoring procedures is also similar to the Ninth Circuit's description
of injuries occasioned by a failure to follow NEPA requirements - the risk that
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environmental impacts will be overlooked.2" If the failure to momtor is prop-
erly characterized as a procedural claim, Ohio Forestry and Lujan stand for the
proposition that further site specific allegations are unnecessary
Absent the misplaced requirements of site-specific allegations, Peterson,
Martin, Wyoming Outdoor Council, and Oregon Natural Resources Council
Action demonstrate more workable resolutions of agencies' failures to properly
follow mandatory regulations. These decisions explicitly recogmze that
agency decisions to ignore their own regulations are reviewable under the
APA as final agency actions or failures to act.
On the other hand, Ecology Center represents an overly restrictive reading
of Ohio Forestry that allows the Forest Service to ignore its own LRMPs and
thereby violate the spnt and letter of the environmental acts that require these
plans to guide all activities in our national forests. Until the effect of Ohio
Forestry on such cases is clarified, environmental plaintiffs can protect their
claims by basing them in challenges to site-specific actions. A requirement of
site-specific activity in these cases elevates form over function and it is doubt-
ful the Supreme Court intended such an interpretation or result.
225. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1514

